HomeMy WebLinkAbout1978-0207.McGuire.81-05-11IN THE MATYER OF AN ARSITRATION
Under The
CROW EMPLiYEES COLLECTIVE BAt7GPIN!NG ACT
3efore
THE GR!EVANCE SETTLEMENT 3OARD
Between:
Sefore:
F.2r the Grievor: --
For t!\e Empluyer:
Hearinq:
Ms. Y?rcia KcGuire
- And -
The Crown in Right of Ontario
(Mifiistry of the Attorney
General)
Grievor
Employer
Prof. K. 2. Swan Vice Chaiman
Mr. F. T. Coilict Member
Ms. E. McIntyre Membet
:k. G. Richards, Grievance Cff!cer
Ontario Ptiblic Service Empioyees Union
Mr. J. ZaWd?y, CcUnSei
Ministry of the Attorney General
December 8th‘ 1980
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AWARD
At the cosonencement of the hearing in this matter,
the parties submitted an agreed statement of facts as follows:
"The incumbent of position 7319-14 in
Windsor (Miss Demarce - Court Reporter 1 -
Atypical) obtained a promotion, effective
June 26. 1978 (~Competition A.G. 136/78, to
a Court Reporter 2 position in the Office
of the Local Registrar, S.C.O., Chatham.
No.notice of any "vacancy" was ever posted
in relation to the Windsor Court Reporter 1
position 7319-14 and no competition was
ever coansenced.
On August 8th, 1978, Miss M. S. Damphouse,
an incumbent in Toronto position 8310-18
(Sheriff's Officer 1). advised the Ministry
by letter that she would be required to
move to Windsor following her forthcoming
marriage and thus resign her position un-
less she could be transferred. This letter
followed initial telephone cormnunications.
At this particular time a freeze on Ministry
staffing actions was in effect under the
direction of Management Board of Cabinet.
A demotional transfer was not treated by
MaazFt Board as an additional staffing
.
By a letter dated September 6th, 1978, Mrs.
C. M. Lind, Regional Personnel Administrator
in the Ministry. wrote to Miss Damphouse
confirming her re-assignment to the position
of Court Monitor-Court Reporter 1 (Atypical)
in Windsor (position 7319-14). The letter
confirmed that'the re-assignment represented
a voluntary demotion effected at Miss Damp-
house's request. This letter followed an
examination test of Miss Damphouse's quali-
fications administered by Mrs. Lind on
August 30th. 1978.
The Mlnistry's decision to demotionally
assign Miss Damphouse was for the following
reasons:
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1. Miss Damphouse had proven herself to be
a good employee in the Ministry since
June 15, 1970 and was considered to be
qualified and suitable for the position
in Windsor, having familiarity with the
Courts system and considerable experience
in the Ministry.
2. The Ministry did not wish to lose a
trained staff-member in view of the
dollar costs of such training.
3. A good employee deserves consideration
by Management in such circumstances and
encourages high morale and productivity.
4. The Ministry was facing a serious staff-
ing situation in view of its restricted
staffing allocation.. The demotional
assignment of Miss Damphouse did not
constitute a "staffing action" under
Management Board rules and thus both
the Windsor and Toronto positions
could be filled with one "staffing
action".
On October 4th, 1978. Miss M. McGuire (now
Mrs. Hamilton), who held the positfon of
Counter Clerk - Clerk 3 General in Windsor's
office of the,S.C.O. Local Registrar, submit-
ted a grievance in writing to the Windsor
Local Registrar grieving that "Management
violated Article 4 of the current Working
Conditions Agreement by filling a job with-
out first posting it."
By a letter dated October 16, 1978, the S.C.O.
Local Registrar replied to Miss McGuire and
took the position that the demotional assign-
ment of Miss Damphouse was not in contraven-
tlon of the Collective Agreement.
The matter proceeded through the hearing
stage and is now before this 8oard."
It soon appeared that the grievor was asking for a
fon of relief which might involve detriment to a third party.
That person, the i~ncumbent in the disputed job, was not present
and had apparently not been given notice of these proceedings.
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After some discussion, Mr. Richards asked us merely to deal with
the case on its merits and give relief in the form of a declara-
tion of the respective rights and liabilities of the parties, and
to remain seized of the matter in the event that the parties were
unable to agree on specific relief. In our view, such a procedure
could have denied the third party standing at the only stage of
the brocess where she might have had representations to make. We
therefore put Mr. Richards to an election between going ahead with
the hearing while expressly abandoning any right to a form of
relief which would disadvantage the third party, or adjourning
the hearing until proper notice could be given. Mr. Richards
chose the first course, and we proceeded on the basis that the
third party could not be prejudiced by any decision or order made
in this matter.
The provision of the Collective Agreement (Working
Conditions, 1978-79) directly-applicable to this matter is Article
4, which provides:
Article 4 - POSTING Ah’D FILLImC OF VACANCIES
OR NEW POSITIONS
4.1 When a vacanqj omw8 in the clussified
service for a bargdning unit poaitia
or a new cLzesified position is created in
the bargaining unit, it shatl be advertised
for at least five (5) working &a prior to
ths established closing date when advertised
&thin a Efini&ry, or it &a22 be advertised
for at least ten 1101 woricing daya @or to
the established closing date when adver&ed
service-wide. AZ2 app2ications wiiz2 be
acknartedged. Vflere practicable, notice of
vucancies shut1 be posted on bulletin boards.
4.2 The notice of vacancy shall state, where
appticoble, the nature end title of
position, salary, q~ualificationa reqkred czd
the area in which the position ezCsts.
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4.3 In fiZZing a vacancy, the employer shalt
give prima2y consideration to qualifica-
tions and ability to perfon the required
duties. Where qualifications and ability are
relatively equal, length of contimuus service
shall be a coneideration.
4.4. An applicant who is in&ted to attend ma
interview within the Civil Service shdl
be -ted time-off oith no 208s of pay and
with no loss of credits to attend the inter-
view, provided that, the time-off does not
unduly interfere with operat+Q requirements.
Specifically, the faflure of the Employer to post the Windsor
position (7319-14) before filling it by the transfer of Miss Damp-
-T house is asserted to be in breach of clause 4.1. It is cornnon
ground that the position was never posted; the dispute before
us relates to the applicability of clause 4.1 to the present
situation, and the existence of a "vacancy" to trigger its opera-
tion if it is appljcable.
At first impresston, of course, it is difficult to
come to any conclusion but that there was a breach of the collect-
tive agreement. A position became unoccupied by reason of the
promotion of its incumbent and there was at least a tacit decision
by the Employer that the duties of the position were neither to be
reassigned nor to be allowed to lapse, since infact another person
was transferred to perform the job. These are the generally accepted L
hallmarks of a "vacancy": see Bram a& neat@: Canadian Labour
Arbitration (1977) at pp. 203-206. Since the apparent vacancy was
not posted, it seems appropriate to turn, without in any way alter-
ing the onus of proof which lies on the Union, to the arguments
advanced by the Employer jn justification of the course of action
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followed in this case.
Mr. Zarudny presented a multi-faceted defence of the
Employer's action which relies upon the statutory and regulatory
provisions governing collective bargaining for Crown employees,
the interpretation to be given to Article 4 fn the context of the
rest of the collective agreement and the special nature of the
.Government employer. Reduced to its simplest terms, Mr. Zarudny's
argument is that Article 4 relates to promotional opportunities
c;::: only, and cannot relate to either lateral transfers or demotions,
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and that when a position becomes available the Employer is entitled
to exercise an unfettered management right to transfer employees
throughout the Province-wide bargaining unit, including transfers
that are in the form of a voluntary demotion such as that used to
accoammdate Miss Damphouse's wish to move to Windsor, until the
Employer has exhausted all of the personnel changes it wishes to
make which do not constitute promotions for those employees involved.
At that point when, as it were, the dust has settled, if' a position
(or positions) remains to be filled, the'Employer is required for
the first time to post the vacancy which has finally materialized.
This broad managerial authority was supported chiefly by
reference to Section 17(l)(a) of the Crown hnptogees CoZZectige Bar-
gaining Act, which provides:
Section 17. - (1) Every cotlective agreement
shalt be deemed to provide that it is the
exclusive functton of the employer to mm&e,
which function, without limiting the.gennai-
ity of the foregoing, includes the .nght to
de tennine,
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(..~:
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(cl employment, appointment, com;,Lement,
orgcmisation, assignment, discipline,
dismissal, suspension, work n;e Sods
and procedures, kinds and locations
of equipment and c7ussifiiation of
positions; ad
Ib) merit system, training and devetop-
merit,, appraisal and superannuation,
the governing principles of which
are subject to review by the employer
with the bazyaining agent,
and such matters will not be the subject of
coZZective bmgain&g nor come within the
jurisdictkm of a board.
.Article 4 was, we were informed, first inserted in the collective
agreement by an interest arbitration award dated January 28, 1976
issued by a board chaired by Mr. H. 0. Brown. It has subsequently
been included in successive collective agreements and slightly
modified. It has thus both been the subject of collective bar- I
gaining and has been included within the purported "jurisdiction
of a board" (of arbitration). If Mr. Zarudny's interpretation of
Section 17(l), whfch relies primarily on the use of the word
"assignment" in clause (a), is correct, Article 4 will have to
be given a very restrictive interpretation indeed.
It is interesting that this Board has hardly ever
dealt wtih Article 4 or its predecessors. In Obey rmd Minisfiy
of Transportation and Communicatiolts, 15/78 (Weatherill). a panel
of the Board found that there.had been a breach of clause 4.1,
but without any detailed discussion of the meaning of the terms
used. In Williams and Ministry of Natural .?esources,l6?/77 (SWan)
another panel found that a breach of the provision mlght have
occurred at some time in the past, but with no discussion of the
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meaning of the clause at all. Inreithercasewasthereany suggestion
that Section 17(l) of the legislation might restrict clause 4.1
to mean anything less than similar provisions in private sector
agreements have been found to mean in the extensive arbitral
jurisprudence already briefly referred to.
We turn, therefore, to a detailed examination Ofthe
approach advanced by the Employer. Whatever "assignment" may
mean in Section 17(l), and that is~ certainly doubtful, it must be
read in conjunction with Section 6 of the Cram ,Bnvioyees CoZkzct-
.- ive Bargaining Act, which sets out matters clearly within the scope
of collective bargaining in the following terms:
6. Upon being gmnted representation righta,
the employee organization is authoriaed to
bargain with the employer on terns and con-
ditions of employment, ezcept as to matters
that are sxctusively the function of the
employer under subsection 1 of Section 17,
anda oithout limiting the generality of the
foregoing,~ incZuding rat88 of remnemtion,
hours of work, overtime rmd other pren&m
allownce for work performed, the mileage
mte puyabte to an employee for mites
travelled when he is required to use his
am automobiLe on the employer's business,
benefits pertuining to time not worked by
employees including paid hoZiday8, paid
vacations, group life insunmce, health
insurance and long-term income prctection
insurance, promtione, demotions, tmnsfers,
lay-offs or reappointments of employees,
the procedures applicable to the process-
ing of grisvances, the classification and
job evaluation system, and the conditione
qplicabls to Jeaves of absence for other
than any elective pubLie office or political
activities OP training and development.
Whatever "assignment" means, therefore, it can hardly mean "promo-
tions, demotions, transfers, lay-offs or reappointments of employees"
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llective bargaining since the former is an express exception from co
and the latter an express inclusion.
Mr. Rfchards argued for the Unjon that "assignment"
must refer to the assignment of duties to.positions or tasks to
individuals, an interpretation which is not implausible but for
which no reasoned elaboration was advanced, Mr. Zarudny, for the
Employer, referred us to the Acblic Service Act, Section 4(d),
where the Civil Service Conmission is given a mandate to "assign
L.: persons to positions in the classified service". Regulation 749,
.T promulgated under the FubZic Service Act, provides for "assignment"
in more detail and in a way which appears to give the word a mean-
ing encompassing any designation (except initial appointment) of
a civil servant to perform duties in the public service (see, e.g., ,
Regolatlon 749, s. 4). There is, of course, no reason why the word
"assignment" mus~t mean precisely the same thing in two separate
pieces of legislation, but we think it reasonable that, when legis-
lation like the Crown Empkqess ColZective Bargaining Act alters
employment relationships and creates new rights'and liabilities in
an area hitherto covered by the FubZic Service Act, there is aStrong
presumption that the word "assignment" neans thesamething in the subsequent
enactment as in the first. We therefore lean towards Mr. Zarudny's
argument, and we accept that assignment refers toga broad range of
personnel functions involving the moving of an employee from one
job, position, classification, function, workplace or location to
another.
To accept the Employer's definition, tiever, is not necessarily
to accept its entire argument. A full answer to the present dispute
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requires a careful examination of the Croon EmpZoyees CotZective
Bargaining Act, and in particular a resolution of the impact of
Sections 6 and 17(l) on the subject matter of Article 4 as applied
to the facts of this case. This Board has not yet developed a com-
prehensive theory of the scope of bargaining under the Act, and
such an ambitious venture is probably an inappropriate activity
for a body whose functionis to resolve grievances. We have,
nevertheless, had to dealwiththe effect of Section 17(l) on
the collective agreement on a number of occasions, and we must
now do so again. Although we use theoretics1 language, it must
not be forgotten that we do so only to help ourselves and the
parties to understand how the legislation affects the application
of Article 4 to this specific grievance.
It is important to observe that the legislation does
not establish any hierarchical relationship between Sections 6 and
17(l). Each deals with a broad range of subject matter, "terms and
conditions of employment" and "the exclusive function of the em-
ployer to manage" respectively. Both expressions are followed by
enumerations of specific issues, which are stated to be without
effect on the generality of the broad consignment of matters to bar-
gaining and managerial prerogative respectively. Section 6 expressly
exceptsmattersincluded in Section 17(l), but that does not appear
to create a priority of one section over another as would, for
example, a provision that the latter was to operate notwithstand-
ing the former. Moreover, there are obvious areas of interaction
between the sections: thus "employment" is an exclusive management
function but "terms and conditions of employment" are bargainable;
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"classification of positions" is a managerial prerogative but
"the classification and job evaluation system" is subject to
negotiation.
In our view, the way in which the legislation is
drafted requires a reasonably fluid interface between negotiated
terms relating to matters bargainable under Section 6 and managerial
functions under Section 17(l). This creates a difficult adjudica-
tive role for this Board, but it is not unusual that public sector
collective bargaining legislation involves such difficult but
essential balancing exercises between two broadly stated and con-
flicting rights: see for example, the discussion of the resolu-
tion of similar difficulties under the Ontario Police Act in Swan,
"Interest Arbitration of Non-Economic Issues" in Damie and Jackson:,
Conflict and Co-operation in Police ~abour Re7.utions (1980). Specific-
ally, however, such a balancfng exercise does.not require, and impli-
cftly reject&the sort of paramountcy for the Section 17(l) exclu-
sions whfch is at the core of the Employer's argument. Indeed, the
logical conclusion of the Employer's argument would be to make the
right to bargain on many subjects specified in Section 6 virtually
nugatory; the principles of statutory interpretation, however,
require that meaning be given to both provisions.
The two sections must, in short, be read and applied
together whenever they are urged in aid of an interpretation of a
provision in a collective agreement. Applied to the issue before
us, this approach means that the parties are free to bargain provi-
sions for the collective agreement relating to "promotions. demo-
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tions find3 transfers", but that the outcome of that bargaining
must be applied in the context of an "exclusive lmanageriag
function . . . to determine . . . complement, organization and assign-
ment" (we have included two other enumerated managerial prerogatives
which appear to us to be involved In this dispute, although they
were not discussed by the parties). In the result, the impact of
the "assignment" function is residual in nature; whatever aspects
of the broad compass of "assignment" are not subject to bargaining
under Section 6 remain part of the exclusive function of the employer.
Rut that function is expressly stated to be a right "to manage", and
is thus related to aspects of direction and control. That this
analysis' leads to a role for Section 17(l) that is similar to the
position of management rights ctauses in private sector collective ,
agreements is not surprising; the section resembles such provisions
very closely: see e.g. Sack, Contmct Clauses (1977); p. 62.
In addition, we observe that before the amendments to
Section 6 effected by S.O. 1974, c. 135, s. 3, the right to bargain
had been limited to "the methods of effecting promotions, demotions
CanJJ transfers". That the amendment broadened the scope for bar-
gaining appears to be a further indication that the legislative
intent was to set up Section 6 and Section 17(l) as interactive
and parallel systems for regulating the employment relationship.
For an analysis of another dlsputed bargaining issue, see Re
Ontario Hou6inq Co~omtion et aZ., Ontario Public Service Labour
Relations Tribunal, cases T/7/78 and T/9/78, a matter currently
under judicial review for reasons which do not appear to affect
the issues before us.
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Returning to Article 4, there is nothing in the
language used to justify any limitation of the sort proposed by
the Employer so as to restrict the provision to cases where an
employee would be entitled to a promotion. The clause speaks of
the occurrence of a vacancy and the filling of that vacancy. A
number of arbitration decisfons have indicated that, while a job
posting clause may be limited to promotional opportunities by
proper language to that effect, clear wording would be required
(_..< .e to produce such a result: Re Edwards of Canada, Unit of Ceneml
-T Signat Ltd. (1974). 6 L.A.C. (2d) 137 (Adams). Even when we look
to the statutory limits on the clause, we see that Section 6
permits bargaining in respect of "promotions, demotions and trans-
fers", and Section 17(l) only prohibits bargaining on "assignments"; /
neitheroftise statutory controls can reasonably be interpreted to
shape the general language of Article 4 to cover only promotional
opportunities. In our view, there can be no such limitation.
What, therefore, does Article 4 mean? We feel obliged
(2;: to answer that question somewhat discursively, even though our
strict jurisdiction is only to resolve how it affects this particular
grievance. Given the breadth of the arguments put by the parties,
however, we think a fuller discussion, even if obiter, is called
for. First, the clause is triggered by a vacancy (or the creation
of a new position, which is a matter for another time). The private
sector arbitral jurisprudence has always assigned the authority to
determine whether a "vacancy" exists to management, and has permitted
managerial decisions to re-assign the duties of a job previously done
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by an employee or simply to decline to have those duties performed
by anyone. The jurisprudence is well described in 3rown cmd 3eat+;,
CaMdian tiacr &+itmtion (1977). para. 5:X10. It is clear from
the creation of a managerial authority over "complement, organiza-
tion, .., work methods and procedures" in Section 17(l)(a) that a
similar reservation of management rights over the determination of
a vacancy in the classified service was intended to operate in
respect of the present collective agreement.
The Employer's argument isthat the right to determine
vacancies also includes a right to decide where, geographically,
a particular vacancy will arise. First, the Employer asserts a
right to determine if any position which becomes unoccupied (to
chose a neutral term) is either redundant, or can more effectively ,
be dealt with by a reassignment of its duties in the course of a
reorganization. In general terms, we agree that the Employer is
given such a right by both-Section 17(7)(a) and by the collective
bargaining meaning of "vacancy". Second, the Employer asserts a
right to decide whether other persons ought to be transferred to
perform the duties, for reason of career development, rotation or
deployment of staff, health or efficiency, or, as here, compassionate
grounds. Only after all of these considerations are taken into ac-
count, it is argued, need the existence of a vacancy be determined.
This general authority does not appear obvious from
either Article 4 or from the general jurisprudenc3 on the meaning of
"vacancy". It is to be found, it is argued. from viewing Article 4
in the context of the entire agreement, and in particular clauses
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5.6, 5.7, and 6.2 were referred to. We agree that these provisions
contemplate the possibility of demotions, but they are directed
simply to the establishment of new pay rates in the event that a
demotion takes place, and do not in any way grant an exemption
from any procedural requirements set out elsewhere. The Employer's
argument that a right to demote independent of Article 4 is preserved
by these provisions collapses entirely when we observe that clause
5.2 provides similar rules for calculation of pay in the event of
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a promotion. If, as the Employer admits, Article 4 covers Promotions
despite clause 5.2. why should it not cover demotions despite clauses
5.6 and 5.7?
Mr. Zarudny advanced two other arguments which must be
considered. First, it was observed that the private~sector .jurls-
prudence permitted transfers within a classification to be made
without the necessity to post the position thus filled; Re Rio
AZgom Mines (1972). 1 L.A.C. (2d) 244 (Rayner) was quoted as
authority. The extent to which the principle applied in that
case, and other similar decisions (see BM and Beat@/, srrpra,
p. 204. note 213) might apply to permit some of the transfer rights
asserted on behalf of the Employer should properly be determined in
a case where it arises squarely. It will suffice here to observe
that this does not appear, on the face of the agreed statement of
facts, to be such a transfer. The position filled and the position
occupied by Miss Damphouse prior to the transfer have different
names. different numbers and different levels, and it was considered
necessary to test Miss Damphouse's qualifications for the Windsor
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job despite her satisfactory performance in the Toronto job. In
the absence of detailed proof negating these obvious inferences
from the agreed statement of facts, we cannot conclude.that the
cases cited apply here; we expressly abstain from discussing
how they might affect the situation if they did apply.
The final argument advanced was based on Re Dmdnion
Stores Ltd. (1978)‘ 19 L.A.C. (2d) 337 (Weatherill). In that
case, an employee was transferred from Cornwall to Kingston for
(::::I compassionate (i.e.: family re-location) reasons, and a grievance
.-. by a disappointed Kingston employee that the job was not posted
first was dismissed by the board of arbitration. This is, the
Employer asserts, precisely our case. With respect, it is not. I
In Dominion Stores, a supernumerary position was created in Kingston I
to accormnodate the transferred employee; that was not a case of fill-
ing a vacancy, and the transfer was thus entirely at the employer's
expense rather than at the cost of any other employees who might
have applied. Without deciding, we observe that, even had the
c
fact situations been precisely parallel, the requirement to post
new positions under the present agreement might have created a
duty to post the supernumerary job prior to filling it.
Before concluding, we observe that, although no argu-
ment was based on it before us, the agreed statement of facts refers
to the problems produced by Management Board restrictions on staff-
ing and "staffing actions". These controls on Ministry operation \
are. of course, wholly irrelevant to the rights of individuals vlder
the collective agreement. The Employer under the legislation is
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the Crown in Right of Ontario; its representative for collective
bargaining is Management Board. No unilateral action by Manage-
ment Board can possibly widen the authority of Ministries to act
in ways not authorized by the collective agreement.
The result of this discussion of possible exceptions
from the plain meaning of clause 4.1 is that, in this case, that
plain meaning must apply. The incumbent of job 7319-14 was promoted.
There was no decision that the job was redundant, that its duties
i,.. were to be re-assigned or even, as might have been permissible, _.~~
that it was to be performed in some other geographical area. In-
stead there was a delay in filling it because of the Employer's
own staffing restrictions, and then a decision to fill it once it
seemed possible to do so within these restrictions. Once the
decision to fill the job was made; it is undeniable that the Em-
ployer had determined the existence of a vacancy, and the require-
ments of clause 4.1 were applicable. The Windsor job should have
been posted. Miss Damphouse would have been entitled to apply, as
6:; would the grfevor and anyone else. Had Miss Damphouse been selected
pursuant to clause 4.3, the Toronto job could have been posted and
filled as eventually occur.red. Had no one applied for the job who
was qualified, the requirements of Article 4 would nevertheless have
been satisfied. and the management right to "assign" would no longer
have been affected by the bargained provisions on "promotions, demo-
tions and transfers".
We observe, in passing, that this interpretation not
only accords better with the wording of the collective agreement
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than that advanced by the Employer, it also <works much better
equity. Without a job posting, an effective opportunity to apply
for the job was denied to everyone except Miss Damphouse. She
had. indeed, compassionate grounds for seeking a transfer. Eut
who can know, when the job was not posted, how many other qualified
employees (perhaps even better qualified, more senior employees)
might have had even more compelling compassionate grounds? We
also observe that compassionate grounds are not listed among the /-
( ~. criteria for selection'under 4.3, but that would not prevent the
.1 parties - both Union and Employer - from waiving the clause in
appropriate compassionate circumstances.
(1.
In the result, we ftnd the failure to post position
7319-14 in Windsor was in breach of clause 4..l of the agreement,
as was the selection of Miss Damphouse to fill that job contrary
to clause 4.3. We therefore make a declaration that the grievance
is upheld, and the Board shall remain seized of this matter upending
any.final disposition of the grievance by the parties,
We observe that, since the union has abandoned any
relief which~might disadvantage Miss Damphouse, the grievor may
not be appointed to the position directly (unlikely relfef in
this case anyway) nor may a new competition be ordered in respect
of the job; Miss Damphouse's incumbency has thus been confirmed,
albeit indirectly. We do not wish to limit the ingenuity of
the parties in fashioning a remedy, however, so long as Miss
Damphouse, who had no opportunity to participate in this
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arbitration, is not thereby disadvantaged.
DATED at Toronto this 11th day of May, 1981.
Prof. K. P. Swan Vice Chai%
"I concur"
Mr. F. T. Collict Member
"I cdncur"
Ms. E. McIntyre Member