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HomeMy WebLinkAbout1981-0434.Martin.82-02-03IN THE MATTER OF AN ARBITRATION Under THE CROWN EMPLOYEES COLLECTIVE BARGAW’E4G .9CT Before THE GRIEVANCE SETTLEMENT BOARD Between: Before: -- For the Grievot: M. Mercer-DeSantis Grievance/Classification Officer Onrario Public Service %mployees I!nion For the Employer: J. Benedict :vlanager, Staff Relations Ministry *f Correctional Services Hearing November 4, 1984 Grisvor OPSEU {Lyie lohn ,Martin) and The Crown in Right of Ontario (Ministry of Correctionai Services! Emp!oyer R.J. Delisle - Vice-Chairman L. Robinson - klember D.B. Middleton - Member -2- The Griever was at all material times employed by the :vlinistry of Correctional Services as a Correctional Officer 2 at Fort Frances lail. In that occupation he works on a rotating shift basis. He has a continuous service date from June 1, 1974. The facts from which this grievance arises are essentially agreed upon by the parties. The Grievor was scheduled to work on April 20, 1981, which was Easter Monday. Unfortunately during the previous week the Crievor suffered a heart attack and was off work until September 2.1, 1981. There is no dispute between the parties that Mr. Martin was away from work for a bona fide illness on Easter Monday and the difficulty arises only over the calculation of the amount of pay to which he is entitled for that day. The relevant provisions of the Collective Agreement are: Article 19 - Holiday Payment 19.1 Where an employee works on a holiday included under Article 47, Holidays, he shall bepaidattherateoftimeandone-half(M) for all hours worked with a minimum credit of seven and one-quarter (7%) or eight (8) hours, as applicable. 19.2 In addition to the payment provided by section 19.1, an employee shall receive either seven and one-quarter (7%) or eight (8) hours pay as applicable at his basic hourly rate or compensating leave of seven and one-quarter (7%) or eight (8) hours as applicable, provided the employee opts for compensating leave prior to the holiday. -3- ., 19.3 When a holiday included under Article 47, Holidays, coincides with an employee’s scheduled day off and he does not work on that day, the employee shall be entitled to receive another day off. and Article 51- Short Term Sickness Plan 51.1 Effective the first day of April, 1978, an employee who is unable to attend to his duties due to sickness or injury is entitled to leave-of- absence with pay as follows: (iI with regular salary for the first six (6) working days of absence, (ii) with seventy-five percent (75%) of regular salary for an additionaI one hundred and twenty- four (124) working days of absence in each calendar year. The Employer actually paid the Crievor the eight (8) hours holiday pay required by Clause 19.2, but the Grievor claims in addition an entitlement to eight (8) hours at one and one-half (1%) times his usual wages under Clause 19.1. The decision of this Board in Re Bell and Miitry of Community and Social Services, Swinton, 116/78, is helpful in reminding us of the purpose of the holiday premiums provided for by Article 19: Premium payments for holiday work are designed to achieve the same purposes - to compensate the employee at a bonus rate for work performed on a holiday to which he is entitled by the Collective Agreement or by statute and to dis- courage the employer from demanding such work unless necessary or important. i -4- 5 The~p:evious decision of this Board in Re Cooper and Ministry of Community and Social Services, Swan, 145/77, is particularly instructive to the problem before us. In that case the Crievor had reported for work on a statutory ho!iday for which he was scheduled to work. The Grievor became ill on the job, reported to the emergency department of the local hospital, and was advised to leave work for the remainder of the day. He was at work for two and three-quarter hours (2-3/4) on that statutory holiday. The Employer paid the Griever one and one-half (1H) times his usual wages for the two and three-quarter (2-3/4) hours actually worked plus the eight (8) hour holiday pay required by Clause ,19.2. The Grievor claimed an entitlement to eight (3) hours at one and one-half (1K) times his usual wages under Clause 19.1 plus the eight (8) hours holid ay pay under Clause 19.2. At page 5 of the award we note: Clause 19.1, we observe, is not triggered by the scheduling of work but by the performance of work, since the 8 ho.ur guarantee operates ‘where an employee works on a holiday. Later the Board concluded: We are of the view that the guaranteed credit in Clause 19.1 must be understood to be subject to the employee’s continuing availabiity for work. Once the employee is found not to be capable of working, he is to be treated as provided for elsewhere in the collective Agreement. In the case of illness on a holiday, an employee under this agreement simply receives holiday pay, and that was how Mr. Cooper treated once he left work. An inability to Gzk is different from a lack of work to be done, and ought to be treated differently in interpreting guarantee clauses. The.purpose of such clauses, to deter unnecessary scheduling M-requiring of work on statutory holidays, is still preserved even if one requires an employee to be capable of working in order to benefit from the guarantee. (emphasis added) -5- In Brown and Beatty, Canadian Labour Arbitration, 1977, 450, w read: In the absence of clear language in the agreement to the contrary, arbitrators have held that an employee may simultaneously claim both holiday pay and sick pay so long as he is able to bring himself within the terms of the agreement providing for both of those benefits. (emphasis added) The underlined. portions of that quotation are obviously important. The Grievor maintains that the eleven (11) holidays provided for by Article 47 of the Collective Agreement are paid holidays and are an earned benefit, a part of the pay package that an employee receives through .employment with the’government: He notes that there is no qualification within the agreement that to be paid for the same the Griever must wo;k either the day before or the day after and that there is nothing -in the agreement which bars the receipt of holiday pay while.he is sick. The Griever notes that Article 51 is designed to give salary protection to an employee who is unable to work. The Grievor argues that the “regular salary” to which he is thereby entitled may vary depending on the Griever’s schedule of work. He notes that had he worked on Easter LMonday he would have been paid at the rate of time and one-half (1H) for the eight (8) hours worked, plus he would have received under Article 19.2 an additional eight (8) hours of pay; if the Griever had worked he would have received twenty (20) hours of pay. The Griever maintains that Article 51 entitles him then to receive this “regular salary”. Is the Grievor “able to bring himself within the terms of the agreement I’? The Griever relied on the decision of Re North York General Hospital and Ontario Nurses Association, (1980) 27 L.A.C. (2d) 64, Shime, wherein the Grievor was held entitled to receive concurrent benefits under sick leave provisions and holiday leave provisions. The learned arbitrator there had to consider the meaning of “regular income” in the sick leave -6- provisions within the Collective Agreement and noted that the same could vary depending on the scheduling of the Grievor. Once she was scheduied any entitlement became part of her “regular income ” for ,unich she was entitled to protection under the sick leave provisions within the Collective Agreement. He noted that the Grievor was also entitled to be paid pursuant to the article covering payment for holidays as she had been “required to work” on one of the designated holidays. The difference between that case and this is clear. In that case the learned arbitrator noted that the Griever was entitled as soon as the hospital had “required” the Grievor to work. In that case the relevant provision of the Collective Agreement provided:. A nurse required to work on any foregoing designated holidays, shall be paid at time and one-half her regular straight time rate of pay for all hours worked on such holiday. The learned arbitrator, at page 69, noted: The hospital’s requirements and the falling iii are two separate acts and the circumstances of falling ill does not negate the hos@tal’s requirements. While the grievorS illness prevented her from attending at the hospital to work, it did not lessen the hospital’s requirement for her services, and the act of requiring is evidenced by the scheduling of the grievor for work on that day. Earlier he had noted: By and large some caution should be exercised when considering concurrent benefits and care should be taken to avoid duplicating benefits or double paying employees. Nonetheless there are situations where the Collective Agreement requires that such benefits be paid. The learned ,arbitrator was able to conclude in that case that “the situation was such that payment of the benefits was triggered”. In our case the benefit for premium payment on a holiday is not triggered by the scheduling of the work but by the performance of the work, and the Griever is therefore not “able to bring himself within the terms of the agreement”. -7- Another reason for denying the grievance rests in the “clear language in the agreement to the contrary” which is seen in: Article 21 - Non-Pyramiding of Premium Payments 21.1 There shall be no duplication or pyramiding of any premium payments or ,compensatinglwe provided by this Agreement? In the result the grievance is dismissed. DATED at Kingston this 3rd day of February, 1982. “I dissent” kee attached) L. Robinson iMember D. 8. .Middleton &Member DISSENT The grievor in this case was regularly scheduled to work on Easter Gonday, April 20.1951, which was a statutory holiday under the Collective Agreement. However, he suffered a heart attack during the previous week and was unable to work as scheduled. His grievance, as stated in Exhibit 3 submitted to the Board, is “that he should have received sick pay under Article 51 for April 20, 1981, in addition to the holiday pay which he received for that day.” The grievor acknowledges having received statutory holiday pay for April 20 under Article 19.2 of the Collective Agreement, but claims that he should have received sick pay under Article 51 equal to his regular salary for that day. Had he been able to work instead of being sick, his regular salary for April 20 would have amounted to 8 hours’ pay at time and one-half. He therefore claims a further 12 hours’ pay under Article 51. An alternative formulation of the grievance, which was also argued before the Board, is that Article 51 requires that he be paid the equivalent of the 8 hours due him under Article 19.2 plus 12 hours under Article 19.1? since, had he not been absent due to sickness, payment for a total of 20 hours would have constituted his regular salary for that day for the purpose of Article 51. In the grievance as originally formulated, holiday pay and sick pay are separate and independent benefits under Articles 19.2 and 51 respectively. In the alternative formulation, the result is the same but the contractual basis is different. I prefer the original formulation. The relevant provisions of the Collective Agreement are set out in -- - 2 the majority Award. and may be repeated here ARTICLE 19 - HOLIDAY PAYMENT 19.1 Where an employee works on a holiday included under Article 47, Holidays, he shall be paid at the rate of time and one-half UK) for ail hours worked with a minimum credit of seven and one-quarter (7 l/4) or eight (8) hours, as applicable. 19.2 In addition to the payment provided by section 19.1, an employee shah receive either seven and one-quarter (7 l/O) or eight (8) hours pay as applicable at his basic hourly rate or compensating leave of seven and one-quarter (7 l/4) or eight hours as applicable, provided the employee opts for compen- sating leave prior to the holiday. ARTICLE 51- SHORT TERM SICKNESS PLAN 51.1 Effective the first day of April 1978, an employee who is unable to attend to his duties due to sick- ness or injury is entitled to leave-of -absence with pay. as follows: 0 with regular salary for the first six (6) working days of absence, with seventy-five percent (75%) of ~&rsal~foranadditionalonehundred an twenty- our (124) working days of absence hleachcalendary~. It is clear from reading the majority Award that, if Article 19.1 Were to read Where an employee Is required to work on a holiday” instead of ‘Where an employee works on a holiday”, there would be no room for doubt: the griever was required to work on April 20 and, although unable to work, his grievance would have to be allowed. The problem would seem therefore’ to arise from an apparent conflict between Articles 19.1 and 51.1. The employer argues that. since the .- - - 3- grievor did not in fact work, payment under Article 19.1 ne4 nor be mace. On the other hand, the grievor argues that Article 51.1 requires thar nis regular salary be paid in addition to The S hcurs’ iolida:: ?a:, due Cm :C.CV Article 19.2. Had the griever been able to work, his reglular saiary for \pri! 2: would, as noted, have amounted to S hours’ holiday pay at time and one-haif. In the past, the griever’s regular salary unquestionably included the 8 hours’ pay at time and one-half which he in fact received for the statutory holidays when he was regularly scheduled to work and did work. Hence, correcrly - defined, his regular salary must include the pay he would have received for April 20 had he worked, since on that day he was also regularly scheduled :o work but was unable to do so by reason of sickness. The question therefore is not whether, pursuant to Article 19.1, the grievor worked on the, holiday or not, since being sick he obviously did not. Nor in the question whether, having worked on the holiday, the grievor was correctly paid pursuant to Article 19.1; this question would only arise if the grievor had worked, which to repeat he did not. Rather, the question is, whar - would his rig&u salary have been if he had worked on the holiday, and what is - he consequently entitled to under Alttide 51.1 by reason of having been unable to work due to sickness. The griever’s C&I is not based on Article 19.1, which does not and cannot apply when an employee is sick and hence unable to work. Rather, his claim is based squarely on Article 51.1, and the only function of Article 19.1 in this case is that it serves to determine wnat me griever’s regular salary would have been had he worked on April 20 and to which he is therefore entitled under Article 51.1 because he was sick. Article 19.1 deals with the pay due to an employee who works on a statutory holiday. If an employee for any reason does not work on a statutc;rl, holiday, .Article 19.1 does not and cannot apply. Article 51.1 on the other hand - -4- deals with the pay due to an employee who is unable to work on a statutory holiday by reason of sickness. Accordingly, the key article in this case is clearly .+,rticle 51.1, while ‘Article 19.1 is only peripherally involved. * * + * The majority Award denies the grievance on three grounds: 1) it substitutes Article 19.1 for Article 51.1 as the key article to be considered; ii) it supports this substitution by reference to the majority Award of the Board in Re Cooper and Ministry of Community and Social Affairs, Swan, llr5/77, which dealt with a different although cognate factual situation, and iii) Article 21 of the Collective Agreement. In the result, the meaning and intent of the words “regular salary” in Article 51.1 are negated. Artide 19.1 is given precedence over A:ticle 51.1,, whereas it ought to be the other way around. I shall deal with these three grounds in reverse order. Article 21 is as follows: “Article 21- Non-Pyramiding of Premium Payments 21.1 There shall be no duplication or pyramiding of any premium payments or compensating leave provided by this Agreement.” The 8 hours’ pay required for a statutory holiday under Article 19.2 is not a premium payment. Consequently, the time and one-half required for work on a holiday cannot be a duplication or pyramiding of premiums. What Article 21 forbids is the addition of shift premiums to overtime pay. or the addition of call-back pay to shift premium or overtime pay. Nor presumably would Article 21 allow the increase of isolation pay under Article 20. which is -5- a monthly payment, by reason of overtime worked during a given month. But the article clearly does not forbid isolation pay at the regularly prescribed monthly rate plus such shift premium or overtime pay as may be earned. Neither does it prevent the addition of premium pay for work on a statutory holiday to the basic 8 hours’ pay which the employee receives for the holiday under Article 19.2 whether he works or not and which, to repeat, is not a premium payment. It seems clear to me that Article 21 is not relevant to this case. In Re Cooper and Ministry of Community and Social Services, the grievor was scheduled to work, on a statutory holiday. He reported for work, but after 2 3/4 hours became ill and had to leave for the rest of the day. .He was paid at time and one-half for the 2 314 hours he worked plus 8 hours under , Article 19.2. His grievance was that, since he had worked on the holiday and since Article 19.1 provides for a minimum credit of 7 X or 8 hours as applicable, he was entitled to time and one-half for the 8 hours of the day. . In dismissing the grievance. the majority Award in Re Cooper cites an earlier case, Re Bell and Ministry of Community and Social Services,. Swinton, 116178: as follows: “An employee who is regularly scheduled to work on a holiday is guaranteed a full day’s pay at time and one-half by Article 19.1; even if he only works a few hours on that &da (my emphasis) and then comments: “We do rr)t, however, regard this as anything but a paraphrase of clause 19.1; it is not dispositive of the matter before us nor could it have been intended to be.” I / I -6- This comment is justified on the basis of a distinction which the Award proceeds to make between an employee who does not work the full day because there is no work to be done and the grievor who did~not work the full day because illness prevented him from doing so. Where there is a lack of work, a fact for which the employer IS responsible, the guarantee of 8 hours’ pay at time and one-half is admitted to apply. Where on the other hand the employee is unable to work? a fact for which the employee may be as little responsible as the employer, the guarantee is said not to apply, since it “must be understood to be subject to the employee’s continuing availability for work. . . . An abiity to work is different from a lack of work to be done, and ought to be treated differently in interpreting the guarantee dauses.” There is nothing in Re Bell which gives warrant to .this distinction.’ On the contrary, the decision points out that Article 19.1 is “phrased in mandatory terms, stating that employees ‘shall’ receive the minimum compensation specified.“~ Shall means shall; without reference to any of the many possible reasons for which an employee may not have worked or have been unable to work the full 8 hours for which payment at time~and one-half is ~-guaranteed. Moreover, the statement from Re BeiI quoted above is clear. unequivocal and unqualified. Accordingly, 1 fully concur with Mr. Hennessy’s dissent in Re Cooper and would also have found %at the griever was entitled to be paid for the full eight hours at premium pay.” The substitution in the majority Award of Article 19.1 as the key article for Article 51.1 is found in the following sentence (at page 2): “The Employer actually paid the grievor the eight (8) hours holiday pay required by Clause 19.2, but the griever claims in addition an entitlement to eight (8) - -7- hours at one and one-half (l-1/2) times his usual wages under 19.1.” .And again (at page 6): “In our case the benefit for premium payment on a holiday is not triggered by the scheduling of the work but by the performance of the work.” With respect; I do not agree. The grievor does not claim time and one-half under Article 19.1; this article, as noted, deals with the pay due to employees who work on statutory holidays. He claims it under Article 51.1, which provides that ‘@an employee who is unable to attend to his duties due to sickness or injury is entitled~ to leave of absence with pay” at his “regular salary.” Similarly, if payment for sick leave, at premium rates or otherwise, were to be triggered only by the performance of work, employees off sick would nevertheless have to work in order to obtain sickness pay, which is absurd. It cannot be supposed that the parties, in agreeing to Article 19.1, intended that employees on sick leave would nevertheless be required to work in order to receive their regular salary in respect of statutory holidays. It is~ equally unreasonable to suppose that they intended regular salary to exclude payment for statutory holidays, when work on such holidays forms part of an employee’s regular schedule .and payment for such work consequently forms part of his regular salary. There is no warrant in the Collective Agreement for either of these assumptions, the first of which is contrary to common sense and the second of which requires that a very odd meaning be given to the -word Vegular”. The result of either assumption is that an employee who is regularly scheduled to work and does in fact regularly work on statutory holidays nevertheless cannot include part of his regular pay as regular salary for the purpose of sick pay. In effect, his regular pay is not his Regular pay” for the purpose of Article 51.1. That does not make sense to me. -8- The purposes of statutory holiday pay have been fully canvassed in earlier arbitration awards, notably in Re Bell and Re North York General Hospital and Ontario Nurses’ Association, 27 LAC (2d) 64 (Snime), and it is unnecessary to repeat them. But Re North York General Hospital in addition gives powerful support to the interpretation of Article 51.1 for which the grievor contends. The Collective Agreement in that case included the following: Article 15 - LEAVE OF ABSENCE WITH PAY (SICK LEAVE) 15.01 Pay for sick leave is for the sole and only purpose of protecting the nurse against loss of regular income when she is legitimately ill and unable to work. (a) sick leave will be allowed for sickness for nurses after the completion of their probationary period on the basis of one and one-quarter (UC) days per month of active employment to a total of fifteen (15) days sick leave after one year’s service. Re North York General Hospital discusses at some length the significance of the word nregular” and the consequences flowing from it. The quotations which follow are on all fours with the issue in the present grievance; they are given in full, in order to avoid the danger that a paraphrase might not do justice to their cogency. ‘In assessing the arguments, it is important to understand that both the sick leave and the holiday pay are earned benefits. . . . “The hospital argued that art. 15.01 was for the purpose of protecting the employee’s regular income when she is legitimately ill and unable to work. But what is the griever’s “regular income”? The article does not read that -9- it is protection for a normal day’s pay which is, in effect, how the hospital asks us to read regular income. In our view a nurse’s income may vary, depending on the circumstances. One of the circumstances which affects a nurse’s income is whether the nurse works on a holiday. . . . “Standing at the beginning of any year one cannot say with precision what a nurse’s regular income shall be. Indeed, the income of ‘the nurses in any given year will not be precisely the same. The individual income of any nurse will depend on a number of contingencies including how that nurse is scheduled by the hospital. In the case of the grievor, her regular income for the year would have mchded the hoLda f Thanksevmg because the hospital had ched l2zl or er to work on that day. In addition, bec&e she was scheduled to work she was also entitled’to a lieu day. Once scheduled any. entitlement became part of her “regular income” for which she was entitled to protection under art. 15.01 of the collective agreement. Since her re@ar income for that day, exceeded a normal day’s pay, she is.entitled to protection for more than a normal day’s pay. 1 am also of the view that the griever felJ within the provisions of art. 19.02(b) ‘since she was required to work on Thanksgiving. The act of requiring emanates from the hospital. Because the griever fell ill and was unable to work does not mean that the hospital did not require her. The hospital’s requirements and the falling ill are PO setmate acts and the circumstance of falliiuz ill. does not negate the hospital% requirements. Whiie “the griever’s illness prevented her from attending at the hospital to work, it did not lessen the hospl -tal% requirement for her services, and the act of requiring 1s evidenced .by the scheduling of the griever for work on that day.” (my emphasis) In the next paragraph, I have inserted in parentheses the corresponding dates relating to the grievance in our case, in order to underline the similarity, indeed the virtual indentity, of the facts in the two cases. ‘That notion is confirmed by the hospital’s actions on October 7th (April 19th, 1981.) Essentially, there was no difference between the circumstances of October 7th and 8th (April 19th and 20th) and, yet, the hospital elected to pay the grievor sick pay for October 7th (April 19th). The - f -lO- only difference between the two days is that October 8th (April 20th) was a holiday. The grievor was in no different circumstances on that day from the previous day. On both days she was scheduled to work and on both days she was ill and there is no consistent reason for treating her differently on the one day as opposed to the other. To be consistent the hospital ought to have treated her the same on both days and paid her sick leave for those days. It could not alter the situation and treat her differently. She became entitled to the sick leave because of the circumstances and, in addition, she was entitled to her holiday pay based on the scheduled situation rather than zcznst.fa% assessment based on a hypothetical e gnevor, contrary to the hosprtal’s argument, was not being paid twice but was merely receiving benefits which she had earned under the collective agreement which were triggered by the actual circumstances. . . . “In Sudbury General Hospital of the Immaculate Heart of Mary and Ontario ‘Nurses’ Assoc. (April 4,1979, unreported (Brunner)), the griever, a nurse, received sick pay and claimed holiday pay. The board found that there was “nothing in the collective agreement which ‘prevents or disentitles an employee from receiving both holiday pay and sick pay for the same day, provided the hospital has scheduled her to work on that day”. We concur in that view. “In summary, we conclude that the provisions of the collective agreement governing sick pay and holiday pay are independent and that the griever is entitled to the benefit of both provisions. Had the griever worked on the day in question she would have received not only her pay for the shift but the holiday entitlement as well and that - would not have been considered as a duplication. In these circumstances. we see no reason whv any conceoti notion of se-p&ate benefits replacing that income should diientitle the griever to those independent and mutually exclusive benefits of the collective agreement which she has earned. Such payments for separate purposes are not duplications and do not require an express article in that regard.” (pages 67, 68,69 and 70) The same problem of entitlement to both benefits is approached, from a different angle in Re American Can of Canada Ltd. and International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, Local Lodge 1909, 26 LAC (2d) 189 (Picherk The grievor in that case received holiday pay for the four statutory holidays falling in the Christmas and New Year period 1975-79, but - II - was denied sickness benefits for these holidays. even though he received sickness benefits for the other days which he losr due fo illness. The Boar:: found that: ‘The conviction that it is inherently wrong for an employee to receive holiday pay on the one hand and sickness benefits on the other proceeds from what is, in our respectful view, a misconception of the nature of the sickness benefits provided in the collective agreement. The sickness benefits under the instant agreement are not wages. They are insurance -payments. The griever’s entitlement to them is unqualified save by the condition that he be unable to work due to illness. There is nothing expressed or implied in the collective agreement to reduce ,or cut back the griever’s entitlement ,to those insurance payments in the event of a holiday. In the circumstances of this case, therefore, Mr. Kyriacou’s entitlement to sickness benefits for the four days in question is clear and absolute.” (page 192) However, the Board also found that under the applicable Collective Agreement, holiday pay was subject to certain conditions, which the grievor met in respect of only two of the four holidays. The Board accordingly concluded that the grievor was entitled to sickness benefits for the four holidays, but to holiday pay for only two of them. There are no restrictions on holiday pay in Article 19.2, and the grievor in our case was accordingly entitled to and received holiday for April 20, 1981. Following Re American Can, his entitlement to sickness pay at his regular salary is “clear and absolute,” and following Re North York General Hospital, his regular salary must be held to include the pay which he would have received for working on that day had he not been off sick. I - 12- Since there is no “clear language in the agreement to the contrary”, the decision~in this case should follow the rule laid down in Brown and Beatty at page 450 and quoted at page 4 of the majority <Award, according to which “arbitratots have held that an employee may simultaneously claim both holiday pay and sick pay so tong as he is able to bring himself within the terms of the agreement providing for both of these benefits.” Articles 19.2 and 51.1 so provide, and the grievor is therefore quite able “to bring himself within the terms of the agreement.” * * * * In summary, I conclude that: i) Article 21 is not relevant to this case; ii) the majority Award in Re Cooper is in error: taking into account the unequivocal and unqualified language of Re Bell, iii) Article 51.1 is the-key article to be considered in this case, not Article 19.1. Article 19.1 applies to employees who work on a statutory holiday, whereas Article 51.1 applies to employees who are unable to work by reason of sickness. The consequence of making Article 19.1 the key article is to make it apply to employees who do not work on a statutoty holiday, in this case - to an employee who was unable to do so by reason of sickness; this is contrary to the plain meaning of the article as well as to common sense. The further consequence of making Article 13.1 the key article is to eviscerate Article 51.1 with respect to sick- ness pay for statutory holidays, in that only holiday pay but no sickness pay could be received for statutory holidays unless - 13 - iv) employees off sick worked on the holiday, whereas tile purpose of sickness pay is of course precisely to compensate employees off sick for being unable to work; and a proper reading of the relevant articles, giving each one its due meaning and weight and interpreting it in conjunction with the others which have a bearing on it as well as in light of the two cases I have cited, supports the grievor’s claim. Accordingly, I would have upheld the grievor’s claim. H. L. Robinson, .Member.